## From MITRE ATT&CK to Threat-Informed Defense

A community driven approach to advancing threat-informed defense

Jon Baker May 24, 2023



### about me

Co-founder & Director of the Center for Threat-Informed Defense @ MITRE Engenuity

Former Department Manager - responsible MITRE's Cyber Threat Intel and Adversary Emulation work program.

Led MITRE's security automation work – CVE, OVAL, CPE, MAEC, CAPEC...

Started out as a software engineer

### Working in the public interest to advance cybersecurity for all





### "Solving problems for a safer world"



Non-profit corporation

Founded in 1958

Operates in the public interest

Primarily focused on US Government

Creator of major cybersecurity public resources including CVE and ATT&CK



Subsidiary non-profit of MITRE

Founded in 2019

Operates in the public interest

Focused on global private sector

Home of the Center for Threat-Informed Defense, MITRE ATT&CK Defender and ATT&CK Evaluations programs



### What is MITRE ATT&CK?



Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Active Scanning	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Account Manipulation	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Account Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
Gather Victim Host Information	Compromise Accounts	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Brute Force	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Identity Information	Compromise Infrastructure	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Execution	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Data Encrypted for Impact
Gather Victim Network Information	Develop Capabilities	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access	Container and Resource Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking	Automated Collection	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Data Manipulation
Gather Victim Org Information	Establish Accounts	Phishing	Inter-Process Communication	Browser Extensions	Create or Modify System Process	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services	Browser Session Hijacking	Dynamic Resolution	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Defacement
Phishing for Information	Obtain Capabilities	Replication Through Removable Media	Native API	Compromise Client Software Binary	Domain Policy Modification	Deploy Container	Forge Web Credentials	File and Directory Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Clipboard Data	Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Disk Wipe
Search Closed Sources	Stage Capabilities	Supply Chain Compromise	Scheduled Task/Job	Create Account	Escape to Host	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture	Group Policy Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Configuration Repository	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Endpoint Denial of Service
Search Open Technical Databases		Trusted Relationship	Shared Modules	Create or Modify System Process	Event Triggered Execution	Domain Policy Modification	Modify Authentication Process	Network Service Scanning	Taint Shared Content	Data from Information Repositories	Ingress Tool Transfer	Scheduled Transfer	Firmware Corruption
Search Open Websites/Domains		Valid Accounts	Software Deployment Tools	Event Triggered Execution	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Execution Guardrails	Network Sniffing	Network Share Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material	Data from Local System	Multi-Stage Channels		Inhibit System Recovery
Search Victim-Owned Websites			System Services	External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow	Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	Network Sniffing		Data from Network Shared Drive	Non-Application Layer Protocol		Network Denial of Service
			User Execution	Hijack Execution Flow	Process Injection	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Password Policy Discovery		Data from Removable Media	Non-Standard Port		Resource Hijacking
			Windows Management Instrumentation	Implant Internal Image	Scheduled Task/Job	Hide Artifacts	Steal Web Session Cookie	Peripheral Device Discovery		Data Staged	Protocol Tunneling		Service Stop
				Modify Authentication Process	Valid Accounts	Hijack Execution Flow	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Permission Groups Discovery		Email Collection	Proxy		System Shutdown/Reboot
				Office Application Startup		Impair Defenses	Unsecured Credentials	Process Discovery		Input Capture	Remote Access Software		
				Pre-OS Boot		Indicator Removal on Host		Query Registry		Screen Capture	Traffic Signaling		
				Scheduled Task/Job		Indirect Command Execution		Remote System Discovery		Video Capture	Web Service		
				Server Software Component		Masquerading		Software Discovery					
				Traffic Signaling		Modify Authentication Process		System Information Discovery					
				Valid Accounts		Modify Registry		System Location Discovery					

Modify System Image Network Boundary Bridging

Obfuscated Files or Information Pre-OS Boot

Process Injection Reflective Code Loading

Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy

Execution Subvert Trust Controls Template Injection Traffic Signaling Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Use Alternate Authentication Materia Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox

Evasion

Weaken Encryption XSL Script Processing

### ATT&CK®



### A community-driven knowledgebase of adversary TTPs

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
## Poll: Describe your organization's use of ATT&CK:

- a) We are new to ATT&CK
- b) We considering or plan to use ATT&CK
- c) We use ATT&CK in some aspects of our security program
- d) We use ATT&CK throughout our security program






### Poll Results: Describe your organization's use of ATT&CK:







G0134 M1057 **TA009 Transparent Data Loss** Collection Tribe **Prevention Attributed Accomplishes Prevents** Uses To Uses T1005 **Data From** C0011 Uses Local **System** Uses **Detects Implements DS0017** S0115 **Command** Crimson **Execution** 



Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Service Execution (T1569.002)

cmd.exe /c sc config wercplsupport start= auto && sc start

wercplsupport && copy c:\windows\System32\dialogex.dll

c:\windows\System32\wercplsupporte.dll /y && schtasks /create /tn

"Windows Problems Collection" /tr "regsvr32.exe /s

c:\windows\System32\wercplsupporte.dll" /sc DAILY /st 20:02 /F /RU

System && start "" regsvr32.exe /s c:\windows\System32\dialogex.dll

Scheduled Task (T1053.005)


Regsvr32 (T1218.010)


Privilege

Assessment

ATT&C

### **Cyber Threat Intel**





### **ATT&CK** is community driven

MITRE | ATT&CK°

Matrices \*

Tactics ▼ Techniques ▼

Data Sources

Mitigations \*

Groups

Software

Campaigns

Resources \*

Blog ☑

Contribute

Search Q

#### Contributors

The following individuals or organizations have contributed information regarding the existence of mitigate use of a technique, or threat intelligence on adversary use:

- @ionstorm
- · Aagam Shah, @neutrinoguy, ABB
- · Abel Morales, Exabeam
- · Abhijit Mohanta, @abhijit\_mohanta, Uptycs
- · Achute Sharma, Keysight
- · Adam Lichters
- · Adrien Bataille
- · Akiko To, NEC Corporation
- · Akshat Pradhan, Qualys
- · Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
- Alan Neville, @abnev
- · Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks
- Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike
- Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera
- · Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro

... - - 1 ...

- Krishnan Su
- Kyaw Pyiyt I
- Kyoung-ju K
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- Leo Loobee
- Leo Zhang,
- Lior Ribak, S
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- Liran Ravich
- Loic Jaquen
- Lorin Wu, Tr
- · Lucas da Sil
- Lucas Heilio
- Lukáš Štefai
- Maarten van
- Magno Logan, @

Two major releases per year.

<u>Last update:</u> v13 on April 25<sup>th</sup>

68 Techniques in 2014 ~473 (Sub-)Techniques in 2021 ~607 (Sub-)Techniques in 2023

<20 new Techniques per year</p>
~25-40 new Sub-Techniques per year

Reconnaissance  Active Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure Compromise Accounts Compromise Infrastructure	Initial Access  Drive-by Compromise  Exploit Public-Facing Application  External Remote Services	Execution  Command and Scripting Interpreter Container Administration Command Deploy Container	Persistence  Account Manipulation  BITS Jobs  Boot or Logon Autostart  Execution	Privilege Escalation  Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Access Token Manipulation Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Access Token Manipulation BITS Jobs	Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle Brute Force Credentials from Password Stores	Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer	Adversary-in-the-Middle Archive Collected Data Audio Capture	Command and Control  Application Layer Protocol  Communication Throug Removable Media  Data Encoding	Automated Exfiltration  Automated Exfiltration  Data Transfer Size Limits  Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Impact  Account Access Removal  Data Destruction  Data Encrypted for Impact	•Tough!				
Gather Victim Network Information Gather Victim Org Information Phishing for Information Search Open Technical Databases Search Open Technical Databases Search Open Technical Websites Domains Search Victim Owned	Develop Capabilities Establish Accounts Obtain Capabilities Stage Capabilities	Hardware Additions Phishing Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship	Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Native API Scheduled Task/Job Shared Modules Software Deployment	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Create or Modify System Process Event Triggered	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Create or Modify System Process Domain Policy Modification Escape to Host n Event Triggered Execution Exploitation for Privilege	Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification	Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Input Capture Modify Authentication Process	Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Scanning	Remote Service Session Hijacking Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate	Automated Collection  Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Configuration Repository Data from Information Repositories	Data Obfuscation  Dynamic Resolution  Encrypted Channel  Fallback Channels  Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over C2 Channell Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration Over Web Service Scheduled Transfer	Data Manipulation  Defacement  Disk Wipe  Endpoint Denial of  Service  Firmware Corruption		Tools	•C	hallenging	
Websites/Domains Search Victim-Owned Websites		Valid Accounts	Tools System Services User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation	Execution External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Office Application Startup	Escalation Hijack Execution Flow Process Injection Scheduled Task/Job Valid Accounts	Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hijack Execution Flow Impair Defenses	Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials	Network Share Discovery  Network Sniffing  Password Policy Discovery  Peripheral Device Discovery  Permission Groups Discovery  Process Discovery	Authentication Material	Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged  Email Collection Input Capture	Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Remote Access Softwar	9	Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot		Network/ Host Artifacts		<ul><li>Annoying</li></ul>	
				Pre-OS Boot Scheduled Task/Job Server Software Component Traffic Signaling Valid Accounts		Impair Defenses Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Modify Authentication Process Modify Registry		Query Registry  Remote System Discovery  Software Discovery  System Information Discovery System Legation		Screen Capture Video Capture	Traffic Signaling Web Service				Domain Names	5	<ul><li>Simple</li></ul>	
						Modify System Image Network Boundary Bridging Obfuscated Files or Information Pre-OS Boot Process Injection Reflective Code Loading		Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/Der Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion							IP Addresses		•Easy	
						Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Subvert Trust Controls Template Injection Traffic Signaling Trusted Developer									Hash Values		•Trivial	
						Utilities Proxy Execution Use Alternate Authentication Material Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Weaken Encryption								* Pyramid of Pair	n by David Bianco http://dete	ct-respor	nd.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html	

### ATT&CK and the "Pyramid of Pain"

A global shift towards increasing the cost for the adversary




### **Threat-Informed Defense**




# What is Threat-Informed Defense?

The systematic application of a deep understanding of adversary tradecraft and technology to improve defenses.


## Where does it fit?



## Where does it fit?



### **Threat-Informed Defense Cycle**



**ATT&CK**<sup>®</sup> is at the core of threat-informed defense

Threat-informed defense is a continuous process.

As our defenses improve, our environments change, and adversaries evolve, the cycle continues.


# Poll: Continual test & evaluation of your organization's defenses is...

- a) a under consideration.
- b) on the roadmap.
- c) limited to a few areas.
- d) part of the security practice.






## Poll Answer: Continual test evaluation of your organization's defenses is...





### Threat-Informed Defense is...





A lens, through which, you can understand your security posture



A way to think about your security architecture and operations



A way to prioritize your security strategy and investments



A way of assessing the effectiveness of your security investments

### think like an attacker

### How do we scale threat-informed defense?



The Center for Threat-Informed Defense conducts collaborative R&D projects that

### improve cyber defense at scale






#### Membership is:

- √ Highly-sophisticated
- √ Global & cross-sector
- ✓ Non-governmental
- ✓ Committed to collaborative R&D in the public interest

### A repeatable, scalable, approach to R&D built on

### member-powered collaboration



Systematically identify challenges

Develop solutions together



Center for Threat Informed Defense

#### Problem



Defending against all ATT&CK techniques is simply not practical and, without guidance, determining which techniques to focus on is overwhelming.

#### Solution



Publish a methodology and tools to help defenders systematically prioritize ATT&CK techniques.

### **Impact**



Defenders focus on the adversary behaviors that are most relevant to their organization and have the greatest effect on their security posture.

### **Top ATT&CK Techniques**

The frequency of which an attacker uses a specific MITRE ATT&CK technique over time A specific technique where many other techniques converge or diverge, and eliminating that specific technique would cause disruption to an adversary The opportunity for a defender to detect or mitigate against each ATT&CK technique based on publicly available analytics and security controls

Prevalence Choke Point



Actionability



Significant (TOP) Techniques

https://top-attack-techniques.mitre-engenuity.org/



### Advance threat-informed defense with us

### **Center for Threat-Informed Defense**

**Spread the word** to increase the impact of our work.

Use our work and tell us about it.

**Check out the Impact Report** 

https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/impact-report/

Share your ideas to inform the R&D program.

Advance the research program by joining us.

Follow our R&D

https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/

MITRE ATT&CK: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/">https://attack.mitre.org/</a>

Free ATT&CK Training: <a href="https://mitre-engenuity.org/mad/">https://mitre-engenuity.org/mad/</a>



### Let's change the game!

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